

UNSC

United Nations Security Council



AGENDA

Addressing the Ongoing Humanitarian Crisis, Civil Conflict, and Threats to Regional Stability Arising from the Sudanese Civil War.

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I. History of the United Nations Security Council

The United Nations Security Council was established on 24 October 1945, the day the UN Charter came into force. It is one of the United Nations' six main bodies, and its function is to maintain world safety and peace. Its four main goals are provided in the Charter:

1. To keep the world in peace and safety.
2. To develop friendly relations among nations;
3. To cooperate in solving international problems and promoting respect for human rights
4. To serve as a center for harmonizing the actions of nations.

Among all UN organs, the Security Council alone has the unique authority to make decisions that member states are legally obligated to implement, setting it apart from other bodies that can only issue recommendations.

The council held its first session on January 17, 1946, at the Church House, Westminster, London, with the permanent seat being later established at the United Nations Headquarters in New York City. Sessions have been held in various cities such as Addis Ababa, Panama City, and Geneva, given its international character and worldwide recognition of its central role in keeping peace and security.

Structurally, the Council consists of fifteen members, including five permanent members (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and ten non-permanent members elected for a two-year term by the General Assembly. The five permanent members have veto powers; the non-permanent ones do not. This setup was conceived in conformity with the geopolitical situation in the aftermath of the Second World War. The President of the Security Council is responsible for presiding over meetings, coordinating actions, and acting as the official vote of the Council. The position is based on a monthly rotation, in alphabetical order of the member states' names. The list is adjusted each year as non-permanent members rotate off the Council.

(Note: Current President, Colombia)

The Security Council is designed to be in a state of constant readiness and function. Under Article 28 of the UN Charter, each member state must have a representative present at all times in the UN Headquarters in New York, allowing the council to convene at a moment's notice to address urgent threats to international peace and security.

When a dispute or threat is brought to its attention, the Council initially seeks a peaceful resolution through negotiation and mediation. It may establish principles of settlement, conduct investigations, dispatch special missions, appoint envoys, or request the Secretary-General to use his good offices to facilitate dialogue. It leads the international community in determining the existence of threats or acts of aggression and compelling the parties to settle differences peacefully, proposing terms of settlement. Thus, the Council is actively involved in encouraging friendly relations among nations, an element consistent with the broad guidelines of the UN Charter.

The Security Council assumes a more assertive role when conflicts grow from threats into violence. It can direct belligerents to cease fire, separate opposing groups, and deploy military observers or peacekeeping forces intended to diffuse tension.

The United Nations Peacekeeping is a global mechanism in which international military, police, and civilian personnel are deployed under a partnership between the Security Council, General Assembly, Secretariat, and the host governments to help countries establish peace. These personnel/peacekeepers are collectively known as the "Blue Helmet," and their operations monitor ceasefires, protect civilians from imminent threats, ensure humanitarian aid reaches those in need, dismantle conflict by disarming and reintegrating former combatants, guide the return of refugees and displaced communities, and support the implementation of peace agreements, all while striving to minimize risk to the local population.

Three basic principles guide UN Peacekeeping:

- 1) Consent of the parties;
- 2) Impartiality;
- 3) Non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate.

If peaceful measures fail, the Security Council may take enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter. These include various sanctions, arms embargoes, penalties on specified financial institutions, travel restrictions on named persons, severance of diplomatic relations, blockades, and finally, collective military action. The Council restricts the design of measures to only affect those responsible for threats to peace while minimizing the impact on civilians and the broader economy. If necessary, it may authorize the use of force to restore international peace and security.

The Security Council has recently become prone to discussion and criticism regarding its structure and the veto powers of the permanent members, which often halt urgent matters or paralyse the Council in the face of dire situations. Reform proposals call for expanding membership to include emerging powers and underrepresented areas while improving transparency and reviewing procedures to respond to present-day security threats. (see: "Criticisms," pg. 5)

In conclusion, the UNSC is the principal international institution entrusted with international peace and security. In accordance with the charter, the Council wields broad powers, including fostering disputes diplomatically, imposing sanctions, and taking military action in case of crises. While it has remained widely effective in fulfilling its mandate since its inception, the continued calls for reform serve as reminders to ensure that the Council remains relevant and competent in facing the challenges of the contemporary world.

II. Mandate and Powers

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is one of the six principal organs of the United Nations, established in 1945 with the primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. Its functions and powers are defined in the UN Charter, particularly in Chapters V, VI, and VII, and they encompass a range of diplomatic, legal, and enforcement tools designed to address threats to peace and resolve conflicts among nations.

The UNSC's central mandate is to maintain international peace and security in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations. This involves both preventive and responsive actions to emerging or ongoing conflicts. The Council regularly monitors global situations that could threaten peace and is authorized to investigate any dispute or situation that might lead to international friction. For example, the UNSC has frequently convened emergency meetings in response to crises such as the conflicts in Ukraine, Syria, and the Korean Peninsula, often sending fact-finding missions or requesting reports from the Secretary-General to assess the situation on the ground.

When the Security Council identifies a dispute or threat, it may recommend methods of adjusting such disputes or the terms of settlement. These recommendations can include mediation, negotiation, or arbitration, and may involve the appointment of special envoys or the dispatch of diplomatic missions. The Council's role in conflict resolution is evident in its long-standing involvement in peace processes in regions such as the Middle East, Cyprus, and Western Sahara. In some cases, the UNSC has helped facilitate ceasefire agreements, supported the deployment of peacekeeping forces, and endorsed frameworks for political dialogue.

Another significant function of the UNSC is to formulate plans for the establishment of a system to regulate armaments. This responsibility is rooted in the desire to prevent arms races and promote disarmament, particularly in regions with a history of conflict. The Council has played a role in supporting international treaties and agreements aimed at curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It has also imposed arms embargoes on states or non-state actors deemed to pose a threat to international peace, as seen in the cases of North Korea, Iran, and various armed groups in Africa.

The UNSC is also empowered to determine the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. Upon making such a determination, the Council can decide what measures should be taken to restore or maintain international peace and security. These measures can range from non-military actions, such as the imposition of economic sanctions, financial restrictions, and travel bans, to military actions authorized under Chapter VII of the Charter. As of 2024, the Council maintains 14 active sanctions regimes, targeting entities involved in activities that threaten peace and security, including those related to nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and armed conflict.

If non-military measures are deemed insufficient, the Security Council has the authority to call on member states to take military action against an aggressor. Such actions are rare and typically require broad international support. Notable examples include the authorization of military intervention in Korea in 1950 and Libya in 2011. The Council may also dispatch peacekeeping operations to conflict zones, with more than 70 such missions authorized since 1948. As of 2025, over two million personnel from 125 countries have served in UN peacekeeping operations, which aim to stabilize post-conflict areas, protect civilians, and support the implementation of peace agreements.

Beyond its role in conflict management, the Security Council also has important institutional and administrative functions. It recommends the admission of new members to the United Nations, a process that requires the approval of both the Council and the General Assembly. The Council exercises trusteeship functions in strategic areas, although this role has become largely historical since the completion of the UN Trusteeship System in 1994. Additionally, the UNSC recommends the appointment of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and, together with the General Assembly, participates in the election of judges to the International Court of Justice.

The UNSC's decision-making process is distinctive in that it requires the affirmative votes of at least nine of its fifteen members, including the concurring votes of all five permanent members

(China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States). Each permanent member holds veto power, which can block the adoption of substantive resolutions. This structure reflects the geopolitical realities of the post-World War II era and continues to shape the Council's ability to respond to international crises.

In summary, the United Nations Security Council is vested with significant powers and responsibilities aimed at maintaining international peace and security. Its functions range from investigating disputes and recommending settlements to imposing sanctions and authorizing military action. It also plays a key role in the admission of new UN members, the regulation of armaments, and the appointment of senior UN officials and judges. While the Council's effectiveness can be influenced by the political dynamics among its members, it remains a central institution in the international system for addressing threats to peace and promoting collective security.

III. Historical Context and Evolution of the Sudanese Crisis

Origins and Outbreak of the Conflict

Understanding Sudan's civil war requires going back further than April 2023. The conflict began with decisions made decades earlier than the first shot fired in Khartoum that created the conditions for this war to become inevitable. At its core, this is a story of two military commanders who built their power on the same broken system and eventually turned on each other when that system could no longer manage having them both.

The two parties to the conflict are the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), Sudan's officially recognized national military under General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary organization commanded by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti. In the early 2000s, President Omar al-Bashir faced an armed rebellion in Darfur, western Sudan. Rather than deploying the national army, he armed Arab civilian militias called the Janjaweed and directed them against the rebellion. Between 2003 and 2005, Janjaweed forces burned villages, killed civilians indiscriminately, and committed systematic sexual violence against non-Arab communities across Darfur, killing approximately 300,000 people and displacing over 2.5 million. The ICC indicted al-Bashir on charges of genocide and crimes against humanity, an indictment never enforced but one that established the character of what had been done.

Facing sustained international pressure, al-Bashir simply rebranded the Janjaweed in 2013 as the Rapid Support Forces while keeping their personnel, command structures, and operational methods entirely intact. Hemedti, a former Janjaweed commander, rose through the restructured force to lead it entirely. He consolidated RSF control over artisanal gold mining

operations across Darfur and Kordofan, accumulating an independent financial base that made him one of Sudan's most powerful figures, answerable to no institution but his own.

In 2019, sustained mass protests ended al-Bashir's three-decade presidency and a Civilian-Led Transitional Government (CLTG) was established to guide Sudan toward democratic elections. In October 2021, al-Burhan and Hemedti jointly dissolved it, arrested Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, and seized power together in Sudan's sixth coup since independence. Joint governance, however, masked a rivalry that was always going to break. The framework agreement governing the transition required RSF integration into the SAF within twenty-four months. For Hemedti, absorption into the national army meant losing his command, his political leverage, and his control over the gold economy that sustained him. For al-Burhan, an independently operating RSF made genuine governance of Sudan impossible. Neither man was prepared to yield.

On April 15, 2023, fighting erupted simultaneously across Khartoum and several other cities. Both sides accused the other of firing first, a dispute which was never resolved. Within weeks the RSF seized Khartoum, occupying key government buildings and the international airport. The SAF possessed airpower and heavy weaponry but declined the action of deploying them in a densely populated urban environment. Millions of civilians fled. By mid-2023 the RSF controlled Khartoum and the majority of Darfur.

The war's spread into Darfur carried particular historical weight. As RSF forces advanced, they committed systematic atrocities against the Masalit, Fur, and Zaghawa peoples, the same non-Arab communities targeted by the Janjaweed two decades earlier. Mass killings, sexual violence, and deliberate destruction of civilian infrastructure prompted genocide accusations from human rights organizations and UN bodies. On January 7, 2025, the United States formally determined that RSF forces and allied militias had committed genocide in Darfur, a legal designation carrying specific obligations under the 1948 Convention on the **Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide**.

For much of 2023 and 2024, the conflict settled into a brutal stalemate with the RSF holding Khartoum and Darfur while the SAF operated from Port Sudan on the Red Sea. In March 2025, the SAF recaptured Khartoum, a significant military turning point, though returning residents found much of the city destroyed. In October 2025, RSF forces captured El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur state and the last major city in Darfur outside RSF control, completing their dominance over the entire region. As of mid-2026, Sudan remains divided: the SAF governs from Port Sudan across the east and north while the RSF administers Darfur and Kordofan from the city of Nyala, two parallel military-controlled administrations with no political settlement in sight.

The Humanitarian Crisis

The humanitarian consequences of Sudan's civil war have reached a scale the United Nations has described, without qualification, as the largest humanitarian emergency in the world. This is not a crisis of scarcity alone. However, it is a crisis actively manufactured and sustained by the deliberate choices of both warring parties, who have systematically obstructed aid, weaponized food, targeted civilians, and destroyed the infrastructure on which survival depends.

Displacement

As of mid-2026, Sudan's conflict has displaced more people than any other active conflict on earth. Approximately 11.8 million people have been internally displaced within Sudan's borders since April 2023 and a further 4.1 million have fled to neighboring countries, primarily Chad, Egypt, and South Sudan. Three out of every five displaced Sudanese are children. Both parties have deliberately targeted civilian populations to empty territory and consolidate control over those regions. Communities that flee do not simply return when fighting subsides. As of late 2025, approximately 2.6 million people had attempted spontaneous returns to areas including Khartoum but found neighborhoods damaged beyond habitability with essential services nonexistent.

Famine and Food Insecurity

Sudan is experiencing a food security catastrophe of historic proportions. As of May 2026, FAO, WFP, and UNICEF jointly reported that approximately 19.5 million people, two out of every five people in Sudan, face crisis-level acute food insecurity. Famine conditions have been formally confirmed in El Fasher and Kadugli, with an additional 20 areas across Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan at acute risk. Approximately 135,000 people face catastrophic food insecurity, the most severe classification in the international food security framework. The famine is not natural. The SAF imposes bureaucratic and physical restrictions on aid delivery to RSF-controlled areas while the RSF has systematically looted aid convoys, blockaded cities, and denied civilians of targeted ethnic groups access to food and water during military operations. This constitutes a violation of Article 23 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which explicitly prohibits starvation as a method of warfare. An estimated 825,000 children under five are expected to suffer severe acute malnutrition in 2026, a figure 25% higher than pre-conflict levels. In North Darfur alone, between January and November 2025, nearly 85,000 children with severe acute malnutrition were treated, the equivalent of one child every six minutes.

Sexual and Gender-Based Violence

Sexual and gender-based violence has been employed as a deliberate instrument of warfare, particularly by RSF forces and allied militias operating in Darfur. The systematic nature of these violations, their geographic concentration in areas of RSF territorial control, and their targeting of specific ethnic communities places them within the framework of crimes against humanity under international law. In April 2024, the United States Ambassador cited evidence before the Security Council that women and girls as young as fourteen had been victims of

RSF-perpetrated sexual violence. The UN Office on Genocide Prevention identified sexual violence as a primary indicator of deliberate intent to destroy the Masalit, Fur, and Zaghawa communities, contributing to the US genocide determination of January 7, 2025.

Healthcare Collapse and Children

Approximately 80% of health facilities in conflict-affected areas are not operational and over 540 attacks on healthcare facilities have been documented since hostilities began. OHCHR reporting on areas recaptured by the SAF documented that medical workers and humanitarian personnel perceived to have supported the RSF faced arbitrary detention, torture, and in documented cases extrajudicial killing. Of Sudan's approximately 17 million school-aged children, 14 million are currently out of school with over 2,100 schools converted into shelters for displaced persons. Child soldier recruitment has been documented on both sides, a systematic violation of international humanitarian law whose consequences for Sudan's social fabric will extend far beyond any eventual military resolution.

UNSC Response and Its Limitations

The Security Council has passed resolutions, called for ceasefires, extended sanctions, and heard testimony describing conditions of catastrophic severity. What it has not done is translate any of this into meaningful enforcement. The structural dynamics of the Council have systematically limited the ambition and effectiveness of every measure taken.

Resolution 2724, adopted March 8, 2024, called for an immediate cessation of hostilities during Ramadan. It passed fourteen votes to one, with Russia abstaining. The SAF conditioned any ceasefire on prior RSF withdrawal from civilian areas. The RSF refused. Fighting continued through Ramadan without interruption. Resolution 2736, adopted later in 2024, demanded the RSF halt its siege of El Fasher. Russia abstained again. The siege continued for months, culminating in El Fasher's capture in October 2025. Resolution 2791, adopted in 2025, extended the Darfur sanctions regime until September 2026. Russia's resistance during negotiations prevented any reference to conflict-related sexual violence or the role of mercenary forces, omissions that significantly diminished the resolution's normative value. The existing arms embargo under Resolution 1556 of 2004 covers only Darfur, not Sudan as a whole. Repeated proposals to expand it have been blocked, leaving a legal gap systematically exploited by external arms suppliers.

Russia's conduct at the Council reflects a consistent pattern: abstention on resolutions insufficiently aligned with SAF interests, active dilution of resolution language during negotiations, and outright veto when measures approach meaningful enforcement. In November 2024, Russia vetoed a draft resolution calling for an immediate halt to attacks on civilians. Russia's strategic investment in the SAF, culminating in the Port Sudan naval base agreement, means that measures weakening the SAF are directly contrary to Russian strategic

interests, creating a structural conflict of interest the Council's existing architecture has no mechanism to resolve.

The Jeddah Process, co-led by the United States and Saudi Arabia, secured the May 2023 Jeddah Declaration but both parties violated its commitments within weeks. Geneva talks in 2024 collapsed on the same fault line that has undermined every subsequent effort: SAF insistence that RSF withdrawal from civilian areas must precede any ceasefire and RSF categorical refusal of that precondition. The mediation landscape has been further complicated by fragmentation across the Jeddah Process, African Union framework, IGAD regional process, and a Libya-Turkey track, operating in parallel without effective coordination. The appointment of Algerian diplomat Ramtane Lamamra as UN Personal Envoy in November 2023 has itself been contested, with Sudanese civil society organizations publicly questioning his impartiality.

The UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan, UNITAMS, was expelled by the SAF-aligned administration in February 2024 under the invocation of Article 2(7) of the UN Charter. Sudan is now one of the largest active conflict zones in the world without any UN mission presence. There is no independent monitoring mechanism capable of verifying ceasefire compliance, documenting atrocities in real time, or providing the Security Council with ground-level situational awareness independent of the parties themselves.

IV. Detailed Analysis of Larger Themes

Theme 1: The Crisis of Sovereign Legitimacy and the Erosion of Westphalian Principles

The Sudanese civil war has produced a sovereignty crisis the international legal order was not designed to address. The foundational principles of the post-1648 Westphalian system, codified in Article 2(1) of the UN Charter enshrining sovereign equality and Article 2(7) prohibiting interference in domestic matters, presuppose the existence of a single identifiable sovereign authority within a recognized territorial boundary. Sudan no longer satisfies this presupposition.

As of mid-2026, two parallel administrations exercise de facto governmental authority over distinct portions of Sudanese territory. The SAF-aligned Hope Government in Port Sudan retains international recognition and controls formal institutional infrastructure including the Central Bank of Sudan. The RSF's Government of Peace and Unity in Nyala controls territory comparable in size to France and operates a shadow fiscal system financed almost entirely through illicit gold revenues. Neither exercises authority over the full Sudanese state, yet both claim sovereign legitimacy. This fracture creates immediate legal dilemmas for the Council. When calling for a ceasefire it must determine with which authority to negotiate. When considering sanctions it must establish which entity bears state responsibility under

international law. The ICJ's 1986 ruling in *Nicaragua v. United States* established precedents regarding state responsibility for armed groups receiving external support, but those precedents assume a clearer distinction between state and non-state actor than Sudan's configuration currently provides. Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index ranked Sudan 170th out of 180 countries in 2024 with a score of 15 out of 100, reflecting institutional degradation accelerated dramatically by the conflict. The Security Council must consider not only how to end the fighting but how to support reconstruction of the institutional foundations that any durable peace will require.

Theme 2: International Humanitarian Law Violations and the Implementation Gap in the Responsibility to Protect

Sudan's civil war has been characterized on both sides by systematic violations of international humanitarian law of a severity placing significant obligations on the international community, obligations that have not been met. Both the RSF and SAF have contravened the foundational IHL principles of distinction between combatants and civilians, proportionality in the use of force, and precaution in the planning of military operations. On the RSF's part these violations reached a threshold the United States formally characterized as genocide on January 7, 2025, grounded in the systematic targeting of the Masalit, Fur, and Zaghawa communities of Darfur.

The ICC Prosecutor described RSF conduct in a January 2025 report to the Security Council as demonstrating direct continuity with the methods, actors, and targeted populations of the 2003 to 2005 Darfur genocide. These violations have been documented by the OHCHR Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan, established by Human Rights Council Resolution A/HRC/RES/54/2 in October 2023 and extended through Resolution A/HRC/RES/60/3 in October 2025, whose February 2026 report constitutes the most comprehensive legal record of atrocities committed during the conflict. The RSF's siege of El Fasher, including direct targeting of the Zamzam IDP camp documented in the OHCHR's April 2025 report *Three Days of Terror With No Safe Refuge*, represents a textbook violation of Article 23 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibiting starvation as a method of warfare. SAF retaliatory killings in recaptured areas and targeting of humanitarian workers similarly implicate IHL obligations binding on both parties. The Responsibility to Protect doctrine, adopted at the 2005 World Summit and affirmed in Resolution 1674 of 2006, establishes a three-pillar framework for international response to mass atrocity crimes. Under Pillar One, Sudan's sovereign obligation to protect its population has demonstrably failed. Under Pillar Two, international assistance has been obstructed by both parties' systematic denial of access to monitors and humanitarian actors. Under Pillar Three, collective action has been rendered inoperative by Russia's consistent use of its veto to block enforcement measures. The Libya 2011 precedent, where Security Council authorization under Resolution 1973 was interpreted to extend to regime change, produced permanent skepticism in Russia and China toward authorizing comparable action regardless of humanitarian severity. The consequence in Sudan

is a Council that acknowledges genocide may be occurring yet lacks the political unity to authorize the enforcement measures its formally endorsed doctrine would require.

Theme 3: The Political Economy of Conflict, Gold, Resource Competition, and the War Economy

Any serious analysis of Sudan's civil war must confront a structural reality: both principal warring parties are financially self-sustaining through exploitation of Sudan's natural resources, and this financial independence is the primary reason neither party has a meaningful economic incentive to stop fighting. Sudan is one of Africa's largest gold producers, with total 2024 production estimated at 64 tonnes generating approximately 1.57 billion dollars in potential export revenue. The official Sudanese state received just 183,000 dollars from gold exports that year. The explanation is systematic smuggling organized by both warring parties through transit networks that have rendered Sudan's formal export infrastructure almost entirely irrelevant. The RSF controls artisanal mining operations across Darfur and Kordofan, with 2024 production estimated at 850 million dollars in value, transported through Chad and South Sudan before transfer to UAE-bound private aircraft. Dubai functions as the point at which RSF gold enters legitimate international markets through trading networks obscuring its origin. The UAE Ministry of Trade acknowledged Sudan accounted for 1.97 billion dollars of its gold imports in 2024, a figure substantially exceeding Sudan's total official production. RSF commanders have structured fighter compensation partly around the promise of looting, making territorial predation structurally embedded in RSF operations rather than incidental to them. Russia's June 2024 gold exploration concessions awarded to Russian firms embed its economic interests directly in the SAF's resource base, illustrating how mineral wealth has attracted external actors seeking economic returns alongside strategic ones.

Targeted sanctions on RSF gold trading networks, expansion of the Darfur arms embargo to cover all of Sudan, and mandatory disclosure requirements for gold trading companies handling Sudanese gold represent pressure mechanisms already available to the Council. Their application requires only the political will to deploy them.

Theme 4: Regional Spillover and Threats to African and International Stability

Sudan's civil war has long since ceased to be a contained internal conflict. Its consequences extend across seven neighboring countries, affect critical international trade routes, and intersect with patterns of great power competition that elevate Sudan's significance well beyond the African regional context.

Chad absorbs hundreds of thousands of Sudanese refugees while simultaneously serving as the primary transit corridor for UAE-origin arms destined for the RSF. Egypt hosts over 130,000 refugees while being directly drawn into the conflict through SAF military support, complicating any capacity to serve as a neutral regional actor. South Sudan functions as a critical node in the RSF's gold smuggling network, with Wau and Juba serving as documented transit points for gold

moving toward UAE-bound aircraft. Libya's eastern city of Kufra has become a simultaneous weapons transit hub, with RSF connections to warlord Khalifa Haftar creating overlapping proxy networks linking Sudan's conflict directly to Libya's unresolved political crisis. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development has attempted to maintain a mediation framework alongside the Jeddah Process and African Union initiatives, but its effectiveness has been constrained by member states' competing interests, particularly Ethiopia's complex relationship with Sudan over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam dispute. The most consequential international dimension is the strategic significance of the Red Sea. Russia's February 2025 naval base agreement at Port Sudan, authorizing deployment of up to four warships including nuclear-powered vessels, represents a qualitative change in the strategic geography of a waterway handling approximately 12% of global trade through the Suez Canal. A senior US official warned this would expand Moscow's capacity to project force across a corridor connecting Europe to Asia already subject to Houthi interdiction in its southern approaches. Sudan's domestic conflict has thus acquired a dimension directly implicating the strategic interests of the United States, Russia, China, and the Gulf states simultaneously, transforming what began as a domestic power struggle into a node of great power competition with implications for global trade security.

Theme 5: The Failure of Collective Security and the Conditions for Resolution

Sudan's civil war represents one of the starkest contemporary illustrations of the limitations of the UN collective security system when great power interests diverge from humanitarian imperatives. The system established under the Charter, designed around the premise that permanent members would exercise their authority in the collective interest of international peace and security, has been rendered structurally inadequate by the fact that one permanent member holds direct strategic and economic interests in the continuation of the conflict on terms favorable to one of the warring parties. Chapter VII grants the Security Council authority to determine threats to international peace and authorize enforcement measures including arms embargoes, targeted sanctions, and in extreme cases military intervention. The exercise of these powers requires the concurrence or at minimum the non-veto of all five permanent members. When one permanent member holds a naval base agreement with one party, gold concessions tied to that party's resource base, and arms relationships generating strategic returns, the neutrality effective collective security requires is structurally impossible. The Jeddah Process failed not because of procedural deficiencies but because neither party faced consequences for violating the commitments they signed. The SAF calculated correctly that it could continue fighting and recapture Khartoum without bearing significant international costs. The RSF calculated equally correctly that gold revenues would sustain operations regardless of diplomatic pressure. Effective mediation requires that parties perceive the costs of continued fighting as exceeding the costs of negotiation. In Sudan neither party has reached that perception. Three interventions applied simultaneously offer the most credible path toward

genuine settlement. First, targeted economic pressure on gold trading networks financing both parties, particularly UAE-linked entities serving as primary buyers for RSF gold, would directly reduce the financial capacity sustaining RSF military operations. Second, expansion of the Darfur arms embargo to cover all of Sudan would close the legal gap exploited by external arms suppliers since 2023. Third, establishment of a new UN monitoring mission with an adequate mandate would restore the Council's access to independent ground-level information entirely absent since UNITAMS's expulsion in February 2024. The ICC's jurisdiction over Sudan, established by Resolution 1593 in 2005, means both al-Burhan and Hemedti face potential referral for crimes documented during the current conflict, a prospect that if pursued with explicit Council support could alter the personal calculations of the individuals most responsible for prolonging the war.

Sudan's civil war enters its fourth year without a political settlement in sight. The humanitarian emergency it has generated is the largest in the world. The regional instabilities it has produced affect seven neighboring states and the integrity of a critical global trade corridor. The institutional failures it has exposed reach to the heart of the collective security architecture constructed in the aftermath of the Second World War. The question before this Council is not whether Sudan constitutes a threat to international peace and security. That determination was implicit in every resolution adopted since 2023. The question is whether the Council possesses the political will to act on that determination with the coherence and resolve the situation demands. The answer will define not only Sudan's future but the credibility of this institution in the eyes of those it was created to protect.

V. Past UN Actions

Security Council Resolutions

Resolution 1556 (2004) — Demanded disarmament of Janjaweed militias in Darfur. Imposed an arms embargo on non-governmental forces in Darfur. Note: applies only to Darfur, not all of Sudan.

Resolution 1591 (2005) — Established targeted sanctions (asset freezes, travel bans) on individuals committing violations in Darfur. Created the Sudan Sanctions Committee and a Panel of Experts to monitor compliance. Still formally in force, but the Panel of Experts was dissolved in May 2024 after Russia and China vetoed its renewal.

Resolution 1593 (2005) — Referred the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court. Passed 13–0 (US and China abstaining). The first-ever UNSC referral to the ICC, giving it jurisdiction over Darfur despite Sudan not being a Rome Statute party. Led to arrest warrants for Omar al-Bashir (genocide, crimes against humanity) and Ali Kushayb (war crimes — surrendered 2020).

Resolution 1769 (2007) — Authorized the AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), the largest peacekeeping operation in the world at its peak (~26,000 troops). UNAMID withdrew in 2020 under Sudanese government pressure, leaving a critical protection gap when the 2023 war began.

Resolution 2524 (2020) — Established UNITAMS (UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan) to support Sudan's political transition. Sudan expelled UNITAMS in December 2023; mission formally terminated June 2024.

Resolution 2715 (2023) — First substantive UNSC resolution on the 2023 war. Demanded unimpeded humanitarian access, civilian protection, and an immediate ceasefire. Both parties largely ignored it.

Resolution 2736 (2024) — Demanded cessation of hostilities especially around El Fasher; called for humanitarian corridors. SAF accepted with conditions; RSF disregarded it. No enforcement mechanism.

Human Rights Council

The HRC maintained an Independent Expert on Sudan for years. In 2023, it upgraded this to a three-member Fact-Finding Mission to investigate violations committed in the 2023 conflict. Both the SAF and RSF have denied the mission access to Sudan.

Mediation Efforts

Jeddah Process (2023) — US- and Saudi-facilitated talks produced a Jeddah Declaration committing parties to humanitarian access and civilian protection. Both parties repeatedly violated the ceasefire; talks collapsed by October 2023. Criticized for excluding Sudanese civilian groups.

IGAD Process (2023–2024) — The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (Horn of Africa bloc) launched its own mediation. The SAF boycotted key sessions, questioning Ethiopia's neutrality as co-mediator.

African Union Peace and Security Council — Issued multiple communiqués calling for ceasefires and deployed a Panel of the Wise. Hampered by competing member-state interests (Egypt backs SAF; UAE accused of arming RSF).

VI. Applicable International Law

Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions (1949) — The foundational IHL rule for non-international armed conflicts (NIACs). Binds all parties, including non-state actors like the

RSF. Prohibits murder, torture, hostage-taking, sexual violence, and summary executions of those not actively fighting.

Additional Protocol II (1977) — Extends NIAC protections: prohibits attacks on civilians, starvation as a method of warfare, and attacks on civilian objects. Sudan has not ratified AP II, but many of its provisions reflect customary international law, binding Sudan and the RSF regardless.

Customary IHL — Rules that bind all parties to all armed conflicts through state practice and opinio juris, regardless of treaty ratification. Includes the prohibition on indiscriminate attacks, the principle of distinction (civilians vs. combatants), proportionality, and precaution.

The Genocide Convention (1948) — Attacks on the Masalit and other non-Arab communities in Darfur — mass killings, sexual violence, forced displacement targeting ethnic groups as such — have led the US and UN officials to invoke genocide. The Convention obligates all signatory states to prevent and punish genocide, potentially creating third-state duties to act.

Rome Statute / ICC Jurisdiction — Sudan is not a Rome Statute party, but UNSC Resolution 1593 (2005) granted the ICC jurisdiction over crimes in Darfur. Active investigations cover the 2003–2009 Darfur atrocities and the 2023 conflict. Cooperation from Sudanese authorities has been non-existent.

Prohibition on Starvation as a Method of Warfare — A war crime under customary IHL and Article 8(2)(b)(xxv) of the Rome Statute. Both parties block aid convoys and the RSF loots food supplies. The UN declared famine in parts of Darfur in 2024, directly linking the access blockade to criminal responsibility.

International Human Rights Law (IHRL) — Sudan is party to the ICCPR, ICESCR, Convention Against Torture, and Convention on the Rights of the Child. These apply alongside IHL at all times, including during armed conflict. Relevant protections include the right to life, prohibition of torture, children's rights, and the right to food.

1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol — Sudan is a party. Neighboring states receiving refugees (Chad, Egypt, South Sudan) have non-refoulement obligations — they cannot return refugees to a territory where they face persecution or serious harm.

Kampala Convention (2009) — The African Union's treaty on internally displaced persons. Obligates states to prevent displacement, protect IDPs, and provide durable solutions. Binding on Sudan and relevant neighboring states that have ratified it.

VII. Relevant Frameworks

Responsibility to Protect (R2P) — Adopted at the 2005 UN World Summit. Three pillars: (I) each state's primary duty to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity; (II) the international community assists states in meeting this duty; (III) the international community may take collective action — including coercive measures through the UNSC — when a state manifestly fails. In Sudan, the state (SAF) is itself a perpetrator, and UNSC Pillar III action is blocked by Russian and Chinese vetoes.

UN Charter Chapter VII — Authorizes the UNSC to take binding enforcement action (including sanctions, arms embargoes, and authorization of force) when it determines a threat to international peace and security. All Sudan-related resolutions invoking binding obligations operate under Chapter VII. The veto power of permanent members has prevented stronger Chapter VII measures.

Arms Embargo Framework — The 2004–2005 Darfur arms embargo (Resolutions 1556 and 1591) applies only to non-governmental forces in Darfur. External actors — the UAE (alleged RSF supplier) and Egypt (SAF supporter) — continue to transfer weapons. Without the Panel of Experts (dissolved May 2024), there is no international monitoring body to document violations.

AU Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) — The African Union's framework for conflict prevention and response. Includes the Peace and Security Council, the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System, and the African Standby Force. The AU's principle of "non-indifference" (replacing the OAU's strict non-interference) theoretically permits intervention in cases of genocide and crimes against humanity, but political will and resources have limited its application in Sudan.

Syria Cross-Border Aid Precedent (Resolution 2165, 2014) — The UNSC authorized humanitarian aid delivery across Syrian borders without host state consent, citing the scale of civilian suffering. Frequently cited in Sudan debates as a model for authorizing cross-line and cross-border aid over SAF objections.

IPC Famine Classification Framework — The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, used by UN agencies to declare famine. The IPC famine declaration for parts of Darfur in 2024 has legal significance: it establishes a factual record linking deliberate aid obstruction to mass civilian harm, strengthening the case that starvation is being used as a method of warfare.

VIII. Stakeholder Analysis

1. *Sudanese Armed Forces(SAF)*

Position: De facto government military, internationally recognized, led by Gen. al-Burhan. **Interests:** Retain state power and military monopoly; avoid ICC accountability; secure external support. **Actions:** Controls Port Sudan and eastern Sudan; conducts airstrikes on civilian areas; blocks humanitarian access; expelled UN missions. **External backing:** Egypt, Eritrea.

2. Rapid Support Forces (RSF)

Position: Paramilitary force (~100,000 fighters) led by Hemedti. Descended from the Janjaweed. **Interests:** Formalize political power without subordination to SAF; protect gold mining revenues; avoid ICC accountability. **Actions:** Controls much of Darfur, Khartoum, and Kordofan; responsible for mass atrocities against Masalit and other communities; blocks and loots humanitarian aid. **External backing:** UAE (alleged weapons supply); cross-border tribal networks in Chad.

3. Sudanese Civilian Political Forces

Position: Pro-democracy groups, political parties, and resistance committees sidelined by both warring parties. **Interests:** Civilian-led democratic transition; end to military rule; accountability for atrocities. **Actions:** Largely operating from exile (Cairo, Nairobi, European capitals); issued the Taqaddum coalition platform calling for ceasefire and civilian governance. **Constraint:** No military capacity; excluded from Jeddah talks; deeply divided internally.

4. United States

Position: Active mediator and leading Western voice on Sudan. **Interests:** Regional stability; counterterrorism; preventing a humanitarian catastrophe that destabilizes the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. **Actions:** Co-led Jeddah talks with Saudi Arabia; declared RSF actions "genocide" (2024); imposed targeted sanctions on RSF and SAF-linked individuals; pushed for UNSC resolutions. **Constraint:** Limited leverage over both parties; UNSC action blocked by Russia and China.

5. United Arab Emirates

The UAE's role is the most consequential and most documented of any external actor. Despite consistent official denials, evidence accumulated by UN investigators, Amnesty International, and independent journalists establishes UAE material support for the RSF as one of the conflict's most thoroughly confirmed facts. Weapons including armored personnel carriers, drones, and ammunition have been supplied through transit routes across Chad, Libya, Uganda, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan, in multiple documented cases

concealed within shipments declared as humanitarian aid. A 2024 UN Security Council Panel of Experts report detailed these weapons channels. Amnesty International provided physical evidence of Emirati-manufactured armored vehicles recovered from RSF positions. In March 2024, Sudan's Permanent Representative formally accused the UAE of aggression before the Security Council.

The financial dimension is equally significant. The UAE purchased over 99% of Sudan's 1.03 billion dollars in official gold exports in 2023. RSF-controlled gold production in 2024 was estimated at 850 million dollars, the vast majority smuggled to the UAE through Chad and South Sudan. Dubai functions as the primary global hub through which this gold enters international markets, providing the RSF with a continuous revenue stream financing its war effort. The UAE's motivations are threefold: opposition to the SAF's historical ties to political Islam movements, substantial economic benefit from Sudanese gold trading, and strategic influence projection across northeast Africa.

6. Egypt

Egypt has maintained consistent support for the SAF throughout the conflict. The two countries share a 1,200 kilometer border and Egypt's calculus is direct: instability in Sudan threatens its southern flank and an RSF-aligned Khartoum would be hostile to Egyptian interests. Egyptian military advisors have been embedded with SAF command structures and Egypt has supplied warplanes and reportedly pilots to operate them. Egypt's deeper motivation lies in water security. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam represents an existential concern for a country depending on the Nile for the overwhelming majority of its freshwater supply. Egypt requires a stable, allied Sudan as a partner in that dispute. An RSF-controlled Sudan with UAE backing would fundamentally undermine Egypt's diplomatic position on GERD.

7. Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia has pursued mediation and economic engagement rather than military support. In 2023 it co-led the Jeddah Process with the United States. In May 2023 both the SAF and RSF signed the Jeddah Declaration committing to civilian protection and unimpeded humanitarian access. Both parties violated these commitments within weeks. Follow-up talks in November 2023 similarly failed. Saudi Arabia has pledged up to 85 billion dollars in total investment commitments to Sudan, providing potential leverage that has not yet been utilized as a diplomatic instrument. Saudi motivation is driven primarily by Red Sea security concerns that have intensified considerably following Russia's Port Sudan naval base agreement.

8. Russia

Russia's involvement has been the most strategically significant and the most complicated,

having shifted decisively from one side to the other. The Wagner Group, since reorganized as Africa Corps, operated in Sudan from 2017, securing gold mining concessions under al-Bashir. When war began, Wagner supplied the RSF with surface-to-air missiles that enabled RSF forces to shoot down SAF fighter jets. As the SAF's military position strengthened through 2024, Russia recalculated. What Russia wanted most from Sudan was a naval base on the Red Sea, controlled entirely by the SAF at Port Sudan. Arms deliveries to the RSF slowed and SAF-bound shipments began following Deputy Chairman Malik Agar's Moscow visit in early 2024. In February 2025, Sudan and Russia formalized a 25-year agreement granting Russia a naval base at Port Sudan, the first Russian military base in Africa, authorizing deployment of up to four warships including nuclear-powered vessels and up to 300 military personnel. Port Sudan overlooks shipping lanes carrying approximately 12% of global trade through the Suez Canal. A senior US official warned this would expand Moscow's capacity to project force across a critical global waterway. The conflict has also acquired a Russia-Ukraine dimension, with Ukrainian special forces reportedly training SAF personnel from March 2024 in direct response to Russian involvement. At the Security Council, Russia abstained on virtually every Sudan resolution and in November 2024 vetoed a draft resolution calling for an immediate halt to attacks on civilians.

9. *China*

China has maintained an official position of non-interference, presenting itself as committed to a political solution arrived at by Sudanese actors. In practice this has meant China has not used its considerable economic leverage to pressure either party and has generally aligned with Russia at the Security Council in resisting stronger enforcement measures. China is Sudan's second-largest trade partner with bilateral trade valued at approximately 882 million dollars in 2023. Its primary interests are commodity access and Belt and Road Initiative positioning across northeast Africa.

10. *African Union (AU)*

Position: Primary regional political framework for peace efforts. **Interests:** Uphold APSA principles including non-indifference to mass atrocities; prevent regional spillover; maintain AU relevance as a conflict mediator. **Actions:** AU Peace and Security Council issued ceasefire communiqués; deployed

Panel of the Wise; attempted to coordinate with IGAD. **Constraint:** Member states deeply divided (Egypt vs. Gulf states); limited enforcement capacity; hampered by competing bilateral interests of key members.

11. *IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development)*

Position: Horn of Africa regional bloc attempting parallel mediation. **Interests:** Prevent conflict spillover into South Sudan, Ethiopia, Chad; manage refugee flows. **Actions:** Launched its own peace process; hosted mini-summits. **Constraint:** SAF boycotted key sessions citing Ethiopia's lack of neutrality; IGAD and AU processes have not been effectively coordinated.

12. *Chad*

Position: Most directly affected neighboring state. **Interests:** Manage over 1 million Sudanese refugees; maintain border security; navigate complex ethnic ties between Chadian communities and RSF fighters. **Actions:** Hosts largest Sudanese refugee population; RSF uses Chadian territory for supply lines (alleged); Chad has periodically closed and reopened borders. **Constraint:** Fragile domestic political situation; limited capacity to absorb refugee influx; caught between RSF cross-border networks and SAF pressure.

13. *Republic of Turkey*

Turkey supplied the SAF with Bayraktar TB2 drone systems, the same platform that proved decisive in Libya, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine, providing operationally significant precision strike capability. Simultaneously Turkey attempted to position itself as a mediating actor, co-hosting peace negotiations with Libya in March 2024 aimed at securing a Ramadan ceasefire. The talks collapsed when the SAF declined to accept a truce without prior RSF withdrawal from civilian areas. Turkey's dual role as arms supplier and proposed mediator represents a structural contradiction that has limited its credibility in the latter capacity.

14. *International Criminal Court (ICC)*

Position: Independent judicial body with existing jurisdiction over Darfur via UNSC Res. 1593 (2005). **Interests:** Accountability for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes; state cooperation with investigations. **Actions:** Existing warrants for al-Bashir and others from 2003–2009 Darfur crimes remain unexecuted; new investigations into 2023 atrocities are active. **Constraint:** No enforcement mechanism of its own; Sudan refuses cooperation; key states (Russia, China, US) do not fully support ICC processes.

15. *Islamic Republic of Iran*

Iran supplied the SAF with Mohajer-6 armed drones credited by analysts as instrumental in the SAF's recapture of areas around Khartoum. Iran's motivation is consistent with its broader regional strategy of countering Gulf Arab influence, particularly that of the UAE and Saudi Arabia, in strategically important African states. In March 2025, Iran reportedly requested permission to establish a naval base on Sudan's Red Sea coast, a request declined but one illustrating the extent to which Port Sudan has become a focal point of great power competition.

IX. Case Studies: Former Regional Tensions and Humanitarian Crises of Africa

a) Case Study 1: *Rwanda - The Catalyst of Regional Collapse*

Background and Context

The Rwandan Civil War, which erupted in 1990, was the culmination of a long-drawn ethnic conflict between the Hutu — a proletariat class — and the Tutsi, who occupied a higher position in the social strata. What began as a political movement for democratisation through majority rule ultimately escalated into a genocide against the Tutsi, classified by the United Nations in 1994 as the Genocide Against the Tutsi.

The politicisation of Hutu and Tutsi identity began in the pre-colonial period, when historical social positions were used to define 'ethnic' categories. These distinctions were then entrenched under German colonial rule (1899–1916) and Belgian trusteeship (1916–1961).

November 1959 marked the start of the 'Hutu Peasant Revolution,' signalling the end of Tutsi dominance. By the time Rwanda and Burundi achieved independence in 1962, an estimated 120,000 people — primarily Tutsis — had sought refuge in neighbouring states such as Tanzania and Zaire (modern-day DRC) to escape the violence accompanying Hutu ascendancy, and to organise attacks on Hutu targets and the Hutu government.

In 1988, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was founded in Kampala, Uganda, as a political and military movement seeking the repatriation of Rwandans in exile and reform of the Rwandan government. The subsequent Civil War was fought between the RPF and the Hutu-led Rwandan government.

State-led propaganda labelled all Tutsi in Rwanda as 'cockroaches.' The assassination of the Presidents of Burundi and Rwanda in a plane crash ignited several weeks of intense and systematic massacres. Key figures:

- 800,000–1,000,000 men, women, and children massacred by Hutu extremists — a rate of killing four times greater than at the height of the Nazi Holocaust.
- 150,000–250,000 women estimated to have been raped or purposely infected with HIV/AIDS.
- Genocide was conducted by the state army and Hutu militia groups: the Interahamwe ('Those Who Attack Together') and Impuzamugambi ('Those Who Have the Same Goal').
- Radio broadcasts actively encouraged Hutu civilians to kill their Tutsi neighbours.
- Regional and French Intervention

The Rwandan Civil War has been marked as one of the greatest failures of the international community, having been classified merely as an 'internal conflict.' Despite initial efforts, international intervention was either unsuccessful, withdrawn, or unsupported.

The RPF was composed mainly of Tutsi exiles in Uganda, many of whom had served in President Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Army, which had overthrown the previous Ugandan government in 1986. Despite its territory serving as the rear base for the RPF,

Uganda denied any involvement in supporting the rebel army. More than 480,000 Tutsi refugees were spread across Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, Zaire, and other East African nations.

Immediately after the RPF invasion in 1990, France and Zaire backed the Hutu government with military troops. France also acted as an overseer of the Arusha Peace Accords, continuing to support the Hutu government as a means of upholding state authority. Up to 2 million Hutus later took refuge in Zaire after the RPF established control over Rwanda at the end of the war.

Regional efforts to contain the conflict included:

- Cease-fire talks and ad hoc summits hosted by Rwanda, Burundi, and Zaire, with participation from Uganda, Tanzania, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), and the United Nations.
- The creation of a Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG).
- The Dar-es-Salaam Declaration on Rwandese Refugees Problem (19 February 1991) — the first significant achievement of these summits.

The most significant regional intervention was the mediation of the Arusha Peace Accords (1992–1993), facilitated by Tanzania and the OAU. However, the Accords ultimately failed, as Hutu extremists opposed the division of political power and were suspicious following the death of President Habyarimana in 1994.

UN Security Council Response and Limitations

The UNSC's response to the Rwandan Civil War was heavily delayed and miscalculated. The genocide ended on 18 July 1994, yet the Security Council did not classify it as such until 8 November 1994, when it passed Resolution 955 to establish the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).

Key Resolutions

- Resolution 812 called upon the Government of Rwanda and the RPF to respect the ceasefire of 9 March 1993, allow humanitarian supplies and the return of displaced persons, and cooperate with UN and OAU efforts. This was an early acknowledgement of the civil war in line with the Arusha Peace Agreements, but it eventually collapsed.
- Resolution 872 (October 1993) established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), tasked with peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and support for the peace process, including implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement of 4 August 1993.
- Resolution 918 (May 1994) attempted to increase UNAMIR troops from 270 to 5,500, but deployment was severely delayed due to Western reluctance to volunteer personnel —

largely a consequence of the recent crisis in Somalia. By the time UNAMIR II reached the ground, the genocide was largely over.

The Belgian Tragedy and UNAMIR Withdrawal

Belgium returned to Rwanda as a primary troop contributor. Ten Belgian peacekeepers were assigned to protect the Hutu President; his assassination led to their brutal murder by Hutu extremists. Under pressure from other nations — and paralysed by the United States, which followed a strict policy of non-intervention following the Somalia crisis — the United Nations was forced to reduce its troop presence from 2,165 to 270.

Operation Turquoise

In June 1994, the Security Council authorised French-led forces to mount a humanitarian mission known as Operation Turquoise. While it saved hundreds of civilians in south-west Rwanda, it also reportedly allowed soldiers, officials, and militiamen involved in the genocide to flee into Zaire through areas under French control. Launched on 22 June — just 12 days before the genocide's end — the operation came far too late. Over 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus had already been killed.

Aftermath of the Genocide, Domino Conflicts, and Regional Instability

Government officials, soldiers, and militia who had participated in the genocide fled to the DRC (then Zaire), bringing with them approximately 1.4 million civilians, most of them Hutu. Thousands died of waterborne diseases, and the refugee camps were used by former Rwandan government soldiers to rearm and stage further incursions into Rwanda.

On 8 November 1994, the Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to prosecute persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda and neighbouring states between 1 January and 31 December 1994. The Tribunal was located in Arusha, Tanzania, with offices in Kigali, Rwanda.

The flight of Hutu refugees into Zaire triggered a Rwandan RPF invasion to eliminate Hutu militant groups, which led to:

- The First DRC War — sparked by Rwanda and Uganda's security concerns over Mobutu's support for rebel groups.
- The Second DRC War — one of the deadliest conflicts since World War II.
- Lasting rifts in the Rwanda–Uganda alliance, stemming from their support of rival proxy

groups (RCD-Goma, RCD-ML, the March 23 Movement) and competition for resource exploitation in the DRC.

- Continued violence, child exploitation, and fragile diplomacy in the Great Lakes Region.

b) Case Study 2 - The Democratic Republic of Congo: Mineral Profits and Child Exploitation

Background and Context

First DRC War (1996–1997)

After 1994, almost 2 million Hutu refugees fled to Zaire and began reorganising into militant groups, causing profound unrest within RPF-controlled Rwanda. Rwanda — with the support of Uganda, Angola, and Burundi — consequently waged the First DRC War against the Mobutu government.

The Mobutu government's moves to strip the ethnic Tutsi Banyamulenge of their citizenship and expel them from the country sparked the rebellion of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (ADFL), subsequently backed by Rwanda and Uganda. After a seven-month campaign, the ADFL succeeded in ousting President Mobutu. Laurent Kabila was installed as the new President and renamed the country the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

Second DRC War (1998–2003)

The war erupted when President Kabila turned against his former allies, Rwanda and Uganda, demanding the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the DRC. He simultaneously allowed

Hutu militant groups to reorganise at the border and moved to exile ethnic Tutsis from his government and weaken Rwanda's military presence in the country. Kabila then rallied a coalition of nations to his defence.

The war drew in nine African nations and approximately 25 armed groups, making it one of

the largest wars in African history — also known as the African World War or the Great War of Africa. Combatants supporting Kabila's government included the armed forces of Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Sudan, Libya, and Chad. Opposing them were Rwanda, Uganda, and Congolese opponents of Kabila, with Burundi participating as an ally of the latter.

The Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) split into two factions: RCD-Kisangani (backed by Uganda) and RCD-Goma (backed by Rwanda). This fracture caused the Rwanda–Uganda alliance to collapse, leading to a six-day massacre in and around Kisangani — a resource-rich area coveted by both countries. Relations between Rwanda and Uganda remain fragile to this day, with both states continuing to support rival proxy groups fighting for control of the DRC.

The Second DRC War became the world's deadliest crisis since the Second World War:

- An estimated 3.9–5.4 million deaths, the majority from curable diseases that became fatal due to the collapse of healthcare and sanitation infrastructure.
- Widespread destruction of infrastructure and illegal exploitation of natural resources.
- Sexual violence deployed as a deliberate weapon of war.
- Millions of civilians forcibly displaced.

Mineral and Resource Exploitation

The DRC's resource-rich soil — home to gold, diamonds, tin, tungsten, copper, cobalt, coltan, ivory, and timber — became both the prize and the curse of the conflict. Resource theft became institutionalised through highly organised networks of exploitation spanning the territories controlled by different warring factions.

- Gold and diamonds provided direct, hard-currency liquidity to purchase arms.
- Tin, tungsten, copper, and cobalt were extracted to fund militia operations and maintain territorial control.
- Kisangani, a major hub of the DRC's diamond trade, was the focal point of the six-day Rwanda–Uganda battle.
- Ugandan soldiers systematically looted gold, diamonds, and timber, extracting an estimated one tonne of Congolese gold valued at over USD 9 million. Their exploitative practices caused the collapse of the Gorumbwa mine in 1999, killing approximately one hundred people trapped inside.
- Local militias and Rwandan-backed rebel factions extracted coltan, gold, tin, and tungsten, which were smuggled across the border into Rwanda.
- Stockpiles of coffee, wood, livestock, and money in territories captured by the armies of Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda were seized and either transferred to those countries or exported to international markets.

Even after their formal withdrawal, Rwanda and Uganda left behind local proxies — including M23, FNI, and UPC — that continue to facilitate illicit mining, plunder gold-rich regions, violate human rights, and control trade routes with the assistance of their external backers. Sexual violence in the DRC was a deliberate tactic used by armed groups to control mineral-rich regions. Militias used mass rape and sexual assault to terrorise and dominate communities, particularly in mining areas. The violence was designed to break the spirit of the population and render them more easily exploitable for labour and resources. Women and children were especially targeted — many suffering from sexually transmitted diseases and all carrying lasting psychological trauma.

The Humanitarian Crisis of Child Soldiers

Beyond acquiring arms, the belligerent powers required manpower to use them. Forced conscription was prevalent in the DRC from 1996, alongside widespread 'voluntary' enlistment. To ensure sufficient numbers, armed factions turned systematically to the recruitment of children. UN agencies estimated in 2003 that children constituted approximately ten per cent of the armed forces.

Children were nominally permitted to join armed forces 'voluntarily' as a means of survival following the collapse of family, social, and economic structures. In reality, free will was a pretence: thousands of children were left with no viable alternative after the destruction of economic infrastructure, the loss of protectors, displacement by conflict, or exposure to propaganda they were too young to evaluate critically.

Methods of Recruitment

- Kidnapping — many children were taken from their homes at gunpoint while their parents looked on helplessly; others were seized while playing in their neighbourhoods or walking along roads.
- RCD-Goma launched intensive recruitment drives in which children as young as eight were recruited, often forcibly, from rural areas and sometimes directly from schools.
- Children under RCD-Goma were made to kill and rape as a means of brutalisation — compelled to kill their own relatives or to commit cannibalistic or sexual acts on the corpses of enemies. Girls were raped, subjected to other forms of sexual abuse, and forced to become commanders' 'wives.'
- By April 2003, MONUC estimated that 20 per cent of RCD-Goma frontline combatants were under the age of 18.

Despite efforts by armed political groups and NGOs to demobilise child troops, groups such as RCD-Goma, RCD-ML, and the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) repeatedly re-recruited child soldiers, including from demobilisation centres run by coalition members. Recent conflicts in North and South Kivu continue to involve child forces exploited by proxy militant groups.

UN Security Council Response and Limitations

The UNSC's response in the DRC revolved around peacekeeping, the withdrawal of foreign forces, demobilisation of child troops, and investigations into illegal resource exploitation. However, the Council remained severely constrained by its reliance on diplomatic pressure to uphold agreements, and several interventions failed due to continued violations by belligerent powers.

Key Milestones

- The Lusaka Agreement (1999), drafted with UN support, established a ceasefire among Angola, DRC, Namibia, Uganda, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe. It also called for a Joint Military Commission, the withdrawal of foreign groups, and the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force to monitor the ceasefire and demobilise armed groups.
- Resolution 1279 established the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), partly deployed in November 1999 and fully operational in February 2000 — by which time several additional violent incidents had already occurred. MONUC remained active throughout the war, providing peacekeeping and logistical support.
- Resolution 1341 (2001) again demanded the withdrawal of Ugandan and Rwandan forces and full implementation of the Kampala and Harare sub-plans for disengagement. Parties once more failed to comply.
- The Second DRC War finally ended with the Sun City Agreement (April 2002), the Pretoria Accord (July 2002), and the Global and Inclusive Agreement (December 2002). The UNSC provided vital technical, security, and logistical support to these agreements, alongside continued MONUC deployment, facilitating the establishment of a transitional multi-party government.

MONUC was subsequently transformed into the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), which continues to monitor ongoing territorial disputes. It remains one of the UNSC's most expensive peacekeeping missions.

c) Case Study 3: Bosnia and Herzegovina

Background and Context

At the beginning of the 1990s, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was one of the largest, most developed, and most ethnically diverse countries in the Balkans. Founded in 1943 during World War II, it was a non-aligned federation comprising six republics — Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia — and a rich mix of ethnic groups and religions, with Orthodox Christianity, Catholicism, and Islam as its main faiths. In 1990, the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina consisted mainly of Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), Serbs, and Croats. Yugoslavia had been governed by Josip Tito, who succeeded in keeping ethnic tensions in check; upon his death in 1980, the federation spiralled into crisis.

Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević, who rose to power in the mid-1980s, incited discord between Serbians in Bosnia and Croatia and the surrounding Croat, Bosniak, and Albanian populations. He altered the Yugoslav constitution to strengthen Serbia's position — granting advantages in the military, mass media, and finance — and promoted a nationalist ideology grounded in a sense of existential threat. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Yugoslavia experienced a period of intense political and economic crisis. Slovenia became the first republic to formally declare independence on 25 June 1991.

In February 1992, a referendum on independence was held in Bosnia-Herzegovina: 99.7% of voters chose independence. The Bosnian Serb leadership boycotted the referendum to prevent secession. Independence was officially declared on 1 March 1992 and internationally recognised by April 1992. Fearing for their political and territorial autonomy, Bosnian Serbs sought to remain aligned with Yugoslavia, and the conflict erupted after Bosnia's parliament declared independence in early 1992.

Genocide and Aftermath

On 2 April 1992, Bosnian Serbs, Serb Special Forces ('Tigers' and 'White Eagles'), and the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) attacked Bosnia and Herzegovina. The war rapidly spread across the country, accompanied by the ethnic cleansing of Bosniak and Croat populations. The conflict between Bosnian Croat separatist forces and the Bosnian Army ended in 1994; the wider war continued until 1995.

Serb forces seized Sarajevo, initiating a four-year campaign of terror. From May 1992, Bosnian Serb forces under General Ratko Mladić used sustained shelling and sniping to target civilian areas and key institutions. The conflict included:

- The Siege of Sarajevo — the longest siege of a capital city in modern warfare — during which snipers in surrounding hills shot at civilians attempting to obtain food and water. ● Mass roundups and executions, confinement in concentration camps, torture, and systematic rape.
- By spring 1992, Bosnian Serb forces occupied most of the country's territory, aided by ethnic cleansing campaigns in eastern Bosnia.

The Srebrenica Massacre

On 6 July 1995, Radovan Karadžić — president of the self-declared Republika Srpska — directed his forces to commence an offensive on the inhabitants of Srebrenica. On 11 July, Bosnian Serb troops led by Ratko Mladić and supported by Milošević's government seized the town, ordered the departure of UN peacekeepers, and carried out the ethnic cleansing of Bosniaks.

Families were separated: men were forced to remain while women and children were transported by bus to Bosnian-held territory. More than 20,000 people were forcibly displaced. The men and boys who remained were systematically executed.

In 2004, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) ruled that the Srebrenica events constituted genocide — a finding confirmed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2007. Survivors filed complaints against both the Netherlands and the United Nations for failing to prevent the genocide. The Hague Court of Appeal subsequently found the Dutch government partly responsible for the murders of 350 men and boys during the massacre.

UN Security Council Response and Limitations

The UNSC's response to the Bosnian conflict was characterised by mandates that were neither adequately resourced nor sufficiently enforced.

- Resolution 713 (September 1991) imposed an arms embargo on Yugoslavia, including the Bosnian government, which was already heavily outgunned by Serb forces. Bosnia contested the embargo, but it remained in effect.
- Resolution 743 (1992) established the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Sarajevo to support the Vance Plan.
- In 1993, the UN declared Sarajevo, Goražde, Srebrenica, and other Muslim enclaves as 'safe areas' to be protected by UN peacekeepers. Resolution 836 expanded UNPROFOR's mandate to include the use of force to protect these areas. Nevertheless, Srebrenica fell in 1995 when Bosnian Serb forces overwhelmed the Dutch peacekeeping battalion stationed there.

The failures of UNPROFOR highlighted the fundamental limitations of peacekeeping missions without a robust mandate or adequate resources, and the consequences of a reluctance to engage offensively. A self-critical report by Secretary-General Kofi Annan acknowledged these failures. Human Rights Watch also criticised UNPROFOR for mishandling the crisis and failing to investigate human rights abuses.

Following the fall of Srebrenica and the signing of the Dayton Accords, NATO assumed military responsibility in Bosnia with the Implementation Force (IFOR), authorised under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Unlike UNPROFOR, IFOR possessed enforcement powers, enabling it to oversee military aspects of the agreement, including territorial transfers and the removal of heavy weapons.

X. Guiding Questions

1. How can a member state guarantee safe corridors for humanitarian aid into besieged areas like El-Obeid and Darfur when both the SAF and RSF systematically restrict access, and what enforcement mechanism gives such a guarantee any meaningful teeth?
2. What operational and jurisdictional limitations do UN agencies and bodies directly under the UNSC face in Sudan - including existing peacekeeping mandates, the Abyei Special Area mechanism, and the sanctions regime - and how should the committee work within or around those constraints?
3. Does the UNSC resolution take a position on post-war political transition, or does it remain narrowly security-focused - and critically, who represents Sudan at the negotiating table: the SAF government, RSF forces, both, neither, or an entirely separate civilian or transitional body?
4. To what extent should the Council recommend, condition, or directly participate in shaping the foreign policy direction of a post-war Sudan, and where does that cross the line into violation of sovereignty?
5. Does the UNSC devise a concrete ceasefire plan between the SAF and RSF - and if so, who implements it, how is it enforced, and how would any proposed territorial or administrative division be delineated - given that every previous mediation track, including Jeddah, has collapsed entirely?
6. How can the Council address the role of illegal gold exports and resource revenues sustaining both warring parties and their external backers, and how does it do so in a way that strengthens Sudan's formal economy rather than destabilising it further?
7. How should the Council respond to documented and systematic use of sexual violence as a weapon of war by both the SAF and RSF - and does it activate existing UNSC mechanisms under Resolution 1325 and the Women, Peace and Security framework, or are stronger instruments required?
8. What framework, if any, does the Council recommend for the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of RSF combatants - estimated at over 100,000 fighters with no formal state structure to return to - given that without a DDR plan, any ceasefire produces an armed vacuum rather than peace?
9. How does the Council address the near-total information blackout inside Sudan - including deliberate disruption of internet and telecommunications by both sides - which directly undermines humanitarian monitoring, atrocity documentation, and any verification of ceasefire compliance?

10. Should the UNSC pursue targeted individual sanctions - asset freezes and travel bans - against specific military commanders on both sides, and if so, how does the committee navigate the diplomatic sensitivity of sanctioning the very actors it simultaneously needs at the negotiating table?

XI. Guidelines for Committee Documentation

The following section outlines the formats and expectations for all written committee documentation submitted during sessions. Delegates are expected to adhere strictly to these guidelines, as the quality and precision of written work will form a significant component of evaluation.

a) Position Paper Guidelines

All delegates are **mandated** to submit a position paper outlining their country's stance and strategy on the agenda(s) under discussion. A well-researched and clearly articulated position paper reflects your preparedness and will form a **crucial component of evaluation** during committee sessions.

b) Format of the Position Paper

Your paper must be structured under the following clearly marked headings:

1. Introduction

Outline your country's broad stance on the agenda and what you aim to accomplish during the committee. This section should clearly state your objectives and proposed direction for negotiations.

2. Existing Programs and National/International Initiatives

Detail your country's past and present efforts related to the agenda. Mention existing national programs, bilateral or multilateral agreements, and involvement in international frameworks relevant to the topic.

3. Proposed Solutions and Future Goals

Lay out the steps your country proposes to take during and after the conference. Be innovative yet practical, and ensure your proposals are aligned with your country's political

and economic realities.

4. Bibliography

All sources referenced must be cited in this section in any consistent format (APA/MLA/Chicago, etc.). Failure to provide a bibliography may result in a deduction of marks.

c) Directives

A directive is an action-oriented document used to shape the progression of a crisis and direct committee response toward a specific situation. All directives must comprehensively address the following: the nature of the action being taken, the parties responsible for its execution, the rationale behind it, the method of implementation, the location of operation, and the intended timeline.

Directives may be classified as either public (overt) or private (covert), and fall into one of three categories:

- 1) Personal Directive: Issued by a single country, outlining the unilateral steps that country intends to take in response to the crisis.
- 2) Joint Directive: Co-authored by two or more countries on the basis of mutual benefit. Delegates are reminded that all agreements must serve the interests of their own country; purely altruistic directives are not permissible.
- 3) Committee-Wide Directive: Drafted collectively by the full committee.

Format:

To: Executive Board

Type of directive (Joint / Committee-Wide) and classification (Public / Private) From: [Country / Participating Countries]

Aim of the directive

Content: [numbered action points]

d) Press Releases

A press release is a formal public statement, typically addressed to media outlets, that communicates a country's or bloc's official position or actions in response to a developing situation. Press releases are always issued collectively, as a group or bloc, and are never personal statements.

Press releases may be used to:

- 1) Outline the steps taken by your country or bloc to address the crisis
- 2) Call upon other countries or international organisations for assistance
- 3) Disseminate information regarding the nature of the crisis
- 4) Strategically shape public narrative (subject to Executive Board confirmation)

The content of a press release must clearly describe what is occurring and what measures have been undertaken. Delegates should ensure the statement is factual, purposeful, and aligned with their bloc's collective position.

Sample Press Release:



e) Communiqués

A communiqué is a formal communication used to establish contact with, or convey a stance to, any party not present within the committee, including countries, organisations, or other third-party entities. Communiqués may also be directed to the Executive Board to formally communicate a delegation's position.

The primary function of a communiqué is the transmission of information. Delegates should use this document type when initiating dialogue with external parties, making formal requests, or placing their country's stance on record with the Executive Board.

Sample communiqué:

Communique

ATTN: Nouri Abusahmain, President of Libya
Dear Mr. Abusahmain,

It has come to the attention of the United States Government that two of our nationals have been kidnapped and are being held hostage by the Al Qaeda terrorist organization. We request that you, in all your capacities as President of Libya, use this authority to have the American aid workers found and returned to either an American embassy, or a UN outpost where they can be safely repatriated. We also ask that you find those responsible for these kidnappings, and persecute them accordingly. Failure to do so will be considered a sign that Libya no longer wishes to have cordial and cooperative relations with the United States, and the US will withdraw investment and aid accordingly.

Sincerely,
US Secretary of State John Kerry

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f)

Chits

Chits are written communications circulated during committee sessions. Delegates must confirm with the Executive Board the permitted number of chits at the commencement of each session. Quality of communication should be prioritised over volume.

There are two categories of chits:

- 1) Delegate Chit: Sent directly to another delegate for the purpose of inter-delegation communication and negotiation.
- 2) Substantive Chit: Submitted directly to the Executive Board. This is used to convey important points not raised during floor debate, to supplement arguments made during a Moderated Caucus in which the delegate was not recognised, or to provide additional relevant information. Substantive chits must be written in concise bullet points rather than paragraphs, and should not be lengthy. Key points may be underlined or highlighted for the Executive Board's attention.

Format:

Delegate chits:

To: Country's name

From: Your country name

[Via EB] *optional*

Content

Substantive chits:

To: Executive Board

From: Your country name

Content

XII. Bibliography

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